Europe\u27s Evolving Regulatory Strategy for GMOs --- The Issue of Consistncy with WTO Law: of Kine and Brine

This Essay deals with one question: If challenged, how would regulatory restrictions on genetically modified organisms ( GMOs ) be judged by a World Trade Organization ( WTO ) adjudicating body. Many of the controversies about the effect of WTO law on domestic regulation have been influenced by the view that the law as it stands may well impede the ability of governments to regulate new and uncertain risks to health and the environment. The result in the Beef Hormones case is often cited for this proposition. In this Essay we aim to show that, contrary to an increasingly widespread popular perception, if WTO law is properly interpreted, GMO-related measures, where non-discriminatory against other WTO Members, can pass the test of consistency with even the most stringent of relevant WTO rules

A Survey of the Literature on the WTO Dispute Settlement System

This paper surveys the law and economics literature on WTO dispute settlement. As a background, we first briefly lay out main features of the legal framework, and discuss possible roles of a dispute settlement mechanism. We then discuss the two main themes in the empirical literature on dispute settlement: (i) the determinants of participation by members as complainants, respondents and third parties; and (ii) the role of the DS system for the settling of disputes. The paper finally points to a number of areas that are in need of further research.WTO; Dispute Settlement; DSU

The World Trade Organization's agreement on government procurement : expanding disciplines, declining membership?

The authors analyze the new Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) that was negotiated between a subset of General Agreement on Tariffs an Trade (GATT) members in the Uruguay Round, focusing especially on the expansion of coverage to services and on the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms. Coverage objective were substantially achieved, although commitments containmany exceptions for services. The transparency of signatories'procurement practices was enhanced and enforcement provisions were strengthened, particularly by the introduction of a bid-protest challenge mechanism, which allows private parties (firms) to invoke the Agreement before national courts. (A potential problem: domestic courts could produce divergent interpretations of the GPA). Unlike most of the other Tokyo Round codes - for example, the agreements on technical barriers to trade (standards), import licensing, customs valuation, subsidies, and antidumping - the GPA could not be"multilateralized."Its disciplines apply only to World Trade Organization (WTO) members that have signed it. Public procurement represents a major source of demand for goods and services in most countries. Getting domestic procurement policies"right"can therefore have major effects on welfare. And improving developing countries'access to global procurement markets could help induce governments to adopt multilateral rules, if those could be shown to be in their interests. The authors explore why only a limited number of countries have signed the GPA. They suggest the pursuit of tariffication as one avenue through which the Agreement might be expanded to cover all WTO members. In the process, the GPA could be improved economically by eliminating current provisions that allow for measures with quota-like effects, and by weakening incentives to seek"absolute"sector-by-sector reciprocity.Rules of Origin,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Decentralization,Economic Theory&Research,Corruption&Anitcorruption Law,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Rules of Origin,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies

Burden of Proof in Environmental Disputes in the WTO: Legal Aspects

This paper discusses allocation of burden of proof in environmental disputes in the WTO system. Besides laying down the natural principles that (i) the complainant carries the burden to (ii) make a prima facie case that its claim holds, WTO adjudicating bodies have said little of more general nature. The paper therefore examines the case law of relevance to environmental policies, to establish the rules concerning burden of proof that are likely to be applied in such disputes. Evaluating this case law, the paper makes two observations,: First, in cases submitted under the GATTWTO, adjudicating bodies have committed errors regarding the required amount of evidence (the burden of persuasion); and second, such errors, as well as errors concerning the determination of the party to carry the burden of providing this evidence (the burden of production), have been committed in disputes submitted under the TBT/SPS Agreements. These errors largely seem attributable to the general absence of methodology regarding the interpretation of some key substantive provisions featuring in the three Agreements.Burden of Proof; Burden of Production; Burden of Persuasion; WTO; Environment

Economic development, competition policy, and the World Trade Organization

At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO ministerial meeting in 2003. WTO discussions since 1997 have revealed little support for ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of the WTO antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is limited to"core principles"-nondiscrimination, transparency, and provisions banning"hard core"cartels. The authors argue that an agreement along such lines will create compliance costs for developing countries without addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms located in foreign jurisdictions. To be unambiguously beneficial to low-income countries, any WTO antitrust disciplines should recognize the capacity constraints that prevail in these economies, make illegal collusive business practices by firms with international operations that raise prices in developing country markets, and require competition authorities in high-income countries to take action against firms located in their jurisdictions to defend the interests of affected developing country consumers. More generally, a case is made that traditional liberalization commitments using existing WTO fora will be the most effective means of lowering prices and increasing access to an expanded variety of goods and services.Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies,Environmental Economics&Policies,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,ICT Policy and Strategies,Access to Markets

The Permissible Reach of National Environmental Policies

Trading nations exchange tariff concessions in the context of trade liberalizing rounds. Tariffs, nonetheless, are not the only instrument affecting the value of a concession. Domestic instruments affect it as well, but public order is not negotiable, and, consequently, is not scheduled. Public order is unilaterally defined, but must respect the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction which are common to all WTO Members and bind them by virtue of their appurtenance to the international community. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between trade and environment. The purpose of this study is to highlight how these rules and the GATT/WTO jointly determine the scope for unilateral environmental policies for WTO Members. In the study we examine the relevant multilateral framework dealing with this issue, as well as the relevant GATT and WTO case-law. We also briefly present the jurisdictional default rules in Public International Law. As a means of focusing the discussion, we consider a series of scenarios, partly building on factual aspects of cases that have already been brought before the WTO. These scenarios are intended to isolate issues of specific interest from a policy point of view. For each scenario we then seek to determine what would the outcome be, in case WTO adjudicating bodies were to explicitly take account of the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, something which has not been done to date. Our main conclusions are two-fold: on occasion, the outcome would be different, had WTO panels observed the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction; more generally, the default rules can help us understand the limits of some key obligations assumed under the WTO. Crucially, absent recourse to the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, one risks understanding non-discrimination (the key GATT-obligation) as an instrument aimed to harmonize conditions of competition across markets, and not within markets, as the intent of negotiators has always been.Trade and Environment; WTO

Doha, Dohalf, or Dohaha? The WTO Licks Its Wounds

The most flattering statement regarding the Doha Round is that there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding its fate. The Doha Round, as originally designed and understood, is not an option anymore. Although a formula has been found to keep the ball rolling, at this stage it is impossible to predict what direction it will take. There exists a lack of leadership to conclude the round and it suffers from inherent birth defects. This absence of a conclusion might send the wrong message at a moment when the WTO is emerging as the only genuine forum of multilateral cooperation. Though this is not the first trade round in the history of the multilateral trading system and definitely not the only one that is taking longer than planned to complete, it is the first time that the round risks being ditched altogether. In all previous rounds, which were essentially ‘business’ deals, trading nations managed to come up with an agreement in the end. This is the first time that they have announced ‘we do it for development’, and they now risk delivering nothing. Something has got to give at this stage, and we are running out of time as far as options regarding ‘deliverables’ are concerned. The accent has correctly been placed on priority issues for the bottom billion. The WTO, even if this effort succeeds, will have to face some tough tests in the near future arising from issues which were not at all addressed during the Doha Round

Let\u27s Stick Together (and Break with the Past): The Use of Economic Analysis in WTO Dispute Litigation

The treatment of a number of issues that are being routinely discussed in WTO dispute settlement practice could benefit substantially, were economists to be institutionally implicated in the process. As things stand, the participation of economists in dispute settlement proceedings is infrequent and erratic: for all practical purposes, it depends on the discretion of WTO adjudicating bodies. There is indirect evidence that recourse to such expertise has been made, albeit on very few occasions. Institutional reforms are necessary; otherwise, it seems unlikely that the existing picture will change in the near future. A look into ongoing negotiations on the DSU review however, leaves no scope for optimism in this respect: involving economists in WTO litigation is not a priority-issue

Driftin’ too far from shore – Why the test for compliance with the TBT Agreement developed by the WTO Appellate Body is wrong, and what should the AB have done instead

Following years of silence, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) issued almost simultaneously three reports dealing with issues coming under the aegis of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The three Panel reports were hard to reconcile, and this feature in and of itself made the task of the AB quite onerous. Some progress has been made and some clarifications have been introduced, but overall the AB has yet to come to grips with a coherent approach regarding the understanding of the TBT Agreement. The main argument in this paper is that the AB, in designing its test for consistency with the TBT Agreement, did not do any different than it would have done had no TBT Agreement existed. It is, nevertheless, response to the question ‘what has the TBT added to the pre-existing legislative arsenal’ that should point to the elements that must be included in developing a test of consistency against which disputes coming under the aegis of the TBT Agreement should be discussed. The suggested approach consists of a two-tier test whereby Panels would first inquire into the innate characteristics of a measure coming under the aegis of the TBT Agreement, before asking the question whether it has also been applied in non-discriminatory manner